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OTHER AUTHORITIES
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-402(1) (as amended 1973)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.
HARRY MAESTAS,

:

Case No. 14585

Defendant-Appellant

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal from the Third District Court, in
which defendant was convicted of the crime of assault by a prisoner,
a felony of the third degree.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried on a two count information alleging that
he committed the crimes of aggravated sexual assault and assault
by a prisoner.

The jury acquitted him of aggravated sexual assault

but convicted him of assault by a prisoner.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order from this Coui^t reversing his
conviction and either vacating the conviction entirely or remanding
the case for a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the trial, Michael William Hart, convicted of first
degree arson and second degree murder (T.13), testified that
on January 15, 1976 while incarcerated in

ff

C" Section of the

maximum security facility at the Utah State Prison, he was struck
in the face by appellant's fist.

(T.17)

Hart testified he

thought the assault was in response to his requests for money
owed him by appellant (T.19).

He further testified that the

appellant forced him to submit to a sexual assault (T.24).

This

part of the witnesses1 testimony was not believed by the jury,
at least not beyond a reasonable doubt, for the jury acquitted the
appellant of this charge (T.321).
Although several other persons testified at the trial, most
testified to facts revolving around the sexual assault charge.
Germain to this appeal, however, is the testimony of appellant himself.
Appellant testified that during the month of January, 1976
he had reason to be Mjumpy" because he believed someone was trying
to harm him.

He testified that at the time of the alleged assault

on January 15, 1976 he was sitting in "C" Section of the maximum
security facility.

Edward L. Cornish, another inmate was sitting

behind appellant and appellant heard Cornish yell Mwatch out".
Appellant had had earphones on watching T.V.; he felt someone
strike him in the shoulder simultaneously with Cornish's warning.
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Appellant testified that because the individual came up behind
his back, he feared he was in danger and struck out hitting the
person, who turned out to be the alleged victim Michael William
Hart.

Appellant further testified he struck Hart because he

thought he might be stabbed.

(T. 213-247)

Edward Cornish was called by appellant and confirmed
appellant's version of the alleged assault.

(T.191-209)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW DEFENSE COUNSEL TO
CROSS-EXAMINE THE WITNESS HART CONCERNING AGREEMENTS
WITH THE STATE IN RETURN FOR HIS TESTIMONY DENIED
APPELLANT HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
The State's chief witness in this case was Michael Hart.
During cross-examination of Mr. Hart by defense counsel, the
following colloguy took place:
Mr. Keller:

And as a result of your testimony in this case

the State has agreed to not send you back to the Utah State Prison,
haven't they?
Mr. Stott:
Court:

Sustained.

Mr. Keller:
Court:

I'm going to object.

Your Honor.

Objection is sustained.

Mr. Keller:

I would like to argue that point, Your Honor,

may we do so outside the presence of the jury?
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Court:

Ask your next question.

Mr. Keller:
Court:

May we at least approach the bench on it?

Ask your next question counsel, please.

Mr. Keller:

What other agreement did you make with the

State of Utah for your testimony, Mr.-Mr. Stott:

I'm going to object to that, there isn't any

evidence, he is assuming things.
Court:

Objection is sustained.

Mr. Keller:

Your Honor, we are entitled to know what agreements

have been made with this man in return for his testimony against the
defendant.

There is a long line of case law that allows us to do

that.
Court:

Ask your next question counsel.
(T.60-61)

Appellant maintains that this refusal by the trial court to
allow defense counsel to bring out the nature of the State's agreement
with the witness in return for his testimony was a denial of his
right under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution to
be confronted by the witnesses against him and to be allowed full
and complete cross-examination of such witnesses.

It was, also

a denial of appellant's right to Due Process of Law pursuant to
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
and Article I Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah.
The precept that Due Process of Law requires full and complete
cross-examination of witnesses is so axiomatic that it seems unnecessar
to provide documentation.

Cross-examination is fundamental to

preserve the right of confrontation of witnesses.
-4-

Although numerous

cases and quotations could be cited, the statement by Mr. Justice
Burger in the majority opinion in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,
39 L. Ed. 2d 347, 94 S. Ct. 1105 (1974) best documents the point:
Cross examination is the principal means by which
the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested. Subject always to the broad discretion
of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly
harassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only
permitted to delve into the witness' story to test the
witness' perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner
has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e. discredit
the witness. . . . A more particular attack on the witness'
credibility is effected by means of cross-examination
directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or
ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly
to issues or personalities in the case at hand. The
partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial,
and is "always relevant as discrediting the witness and
affecting the weight of his testimony." 3AJ. Wigmore
Evidence §940,p775 (Chadbourn rev 1970). We have recognized
that the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying
is a proper and important function of the constitutionally
protected right of cross-examination.
[415 US 317]
Greene v. McElroy, 360 US 474, 496, 3 L.Ed 2d 1377, 79 S.
Ct. 1400 (1959)
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized this important
Constitutional concept.

In State v. Cerar, 60 Utah 208, 207 P.

597 (1922) the Court said:
"The interest of a witness in any particular case in which
he becomes a witness may always be shown, and the effect,
if any, of such interest upon the weight of the testimony
is always a question for the jury."
207 P.at 602.
In perhaps its most recent pronouncement on the issue, this
Court held it was error for a trial judge to have refused to permit
defense counsel to cross-examine a witness as to his interest and
bias after the witness disclosed that a year jail sentence was
to be shortened in return for his testimony against another in a
criminal case.

State v. Smelser, 23 Ut. 2d 347, 463 P.2d 562 (1970).
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Although the Court held this error to be non-prejudicial because
it involved testimony which was merely corroborative,1 the Court
seemed to say that

a defendant has a right to pursue the effect

of an agreement with the state upon his testimony and it is error
not to allow him to do so.

But even more important, the decision

seemed clear that the defendant was entitled to bring out the
witnesses1 agreement or hoped for reduction in sentence as a possible
reason for his not testifying fairly.

The Court held that the trial

court's refusal to allow counsel to go into the subject more
deeply was error, but not prejudicial.
In the instant case, counsel was not even allowed to
inquire into the witnesses1 agreement with the State in return for
his testimony, or even into what the witness hoped to gain through his
testimony.

Based on the Smelser case, this action by the trial

judge constituted error and furthermore this error was prejudicial
to appellant as it was not merely a question of how deeply counsel
could question concerning the witnesses1 bias, but whether counsel
could question him at all with regard to that possible bias.
The United States Supreme Court addressed this very issue in
Giglio v. United States,
763 (1972).

465 U.S. 150, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104, 92 S. Ct.

In that case, a witness for the government testified

falsely that he had received no consideration in return for his
testimony against the defendant Giglio.

1.

463 P.2d at 564.
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It was later revealed that

unbeknownst to the prosecutor actually trying the case, another
prosecucor had agreed not to prosecute the witness
matter in return for his testimony.

in another

The Court reversed Giglios'

conviction on the grounds that the perjured testimony and the
government's failure to inform the jury of its agreement with the
witness denied Giglio due process of law.

Writing for the majority,

Mr. Chief Justice Burger stated:
"Taliento's credibility as a witness was therefore an
important issue in the case, and evidence of any understanding or agreement as to a future prosecution would
be relevant to his credibility and the jury was entitled
to know of it."
31 L. Ed. 2d at 109.
The Court in Giglio quoted from an earlier case,
Napue

v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217, 79 S. Ct.

1173 (1959) in which a murder conviction was reversed because
a government witness denied he would receive any consideration for
his testimony, when in fact he had been promised consideration.
The Supreme Court held in Napue that the due process cause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is violated where a witness testifies falsley
as to the government's promises for his testimony.

Mr. Chief Justice

Warren, writing for a unanimous Court stated:
". . . The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and
reliability of a given witness may well be determinative
of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors
as the possible interest of the witness in testifying
falsely that a defendant's life or liberty may depend."
2 L.Ed. 2d at 1221
Most important

to the Utah Supreme Court's inquiry in the

instant case, however, is the fact that the United States Supreme
Court has, in at least two major cases, held that a jury is entitled
to know what consideration, if any, is promised to a witness in
-7-

a criminal case in return for his testimony; and that if that witness
testifies falsely in that regard, the defendant has been denied
due process of law.

But what jumps out as essential to that

principle is the fact that due process of law requires that the jury
be apprised of any consideration the witness is to receive for his
testimony.

If a trial judge is allowed to prevent a defendant from

even inquiring into the subject in the first: place, isn!t that a
clear denial of Due Process of law?
the instant case?

And isn!t that what happened in

Appellant asks this Court: to establish clearly that

in Utah, as in the rest of the country, due process of law requires the
a trial judge allow defense counsel in a criminal case to inquire of
a witness what consideration he has been promised in return for his
testimony; and to do so by reversing this case and granting appellant
a new trial.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT THE JURY WITH REGARD
TO SELF-DEFENSE DENIED APPELLANT HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
OF LAW.
After both sides had rested and at the proper time, appellantfs
counsel requested the following instruction:
"A person is justified in threatening or using force against
another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes
that such force is necessary to defend himself or a third
person against such other!s imminent use of unlawful
force.,f
This requested instruction copies verbatim the first sentence
from Utah Code Ann. §76-2-402(1) (as amended 1973).
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After hearing

extensive argument on the matter (T.249-263), the trial court
refused to allow this instruction to be given to the jury (T.263).
Appellant argues that the Court effectively denied him his right
to due process of law by not allowing him to argue, nor instructing
the jury upon, his theory of the case:

to-wit that appellant

struck Hart in self-defense.
There was no argument concerning the accuracy of the
language (taken directly from the statute) in the requested
instruction (T.249-263).

The Court seemed to deny the requested

instruction because it did not believe that unlawful force was
used against appellant (T.250, 251). Appellant believes that the
Court was in error concerning both the evidence and the law on
this matter and by refusing to give the requested instruction
the Court effectively took over the function of the jury, i.e.
finding the facts of the case.
A.
THE EVIDENCE
The witness Thomas Gurule (incorrectly spelled in the Trial
Transcript as Rulae or Grulae, see T. 164-170)
during mid-January of 1976 that appellant was

testified that

f,

jumpyn (T.168).

Appellant himself testified that during the month of January, 1976
he was "jumpy" and concerned about his personal safety due to an
incident which occurred in the maximum security kitchen (T.214-215).
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Edward Cornish testified that on the date and at the time in
question, he was in the common area of MCft section watching
television with appellant; that he was sitting behind appellant
who had earphones on, when Michael Hart walked in and into his
(Hart's) cell; that Hart came back out of his cell with a faster
pace toward where appellant was sitting with his back to him;
that he yelled, "lookout Harry !" and that appellant turned and
apparently hit Hart.

(T.194-196)

Appellant confirmed Cornish's version of the events on the
day in question.

He testified that he was sitting watching T.V.

with earphones on one ear and that he was struck on the shoulder
from behind with some commisary slips contemporaneous with
Cornish1s warning of "Watch out!11

He further testified that he

struck Cornish because "he was on me so fast I didn't know why
he was there"

(T.218).

Appellant stated that he had been stabbed

in the back before in prison and that the combination of events
caused him to strike Hart in self-defense (T.218-220).
The sum total of this evidence then was that (a) Appellant
was in a unique environment, prison, where one has to be more concerned
for his own personal safety than in any normal environment; (b) that
he had been stabbed before in prison; (c) that Hart came up behind
his back, struck him with some papers, however lightly, just as
fellow inmate Edward Cornish yelled "Lookout Harr^'or ""Watch out!";
(d) that he instinctively struck the man in self-defense.
Now it may very well be that the jur}r would not have believed th
any or all of the above listed items acted as a justification for
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appellant's assault on Hart, but this evidence clearly shows that
the trial court was incorrect when it noted on the requested selfdefense instruction:
"Refused-no substantive evidence to warrant giving
the instruction."
(R.74 1/2).
Since the jury was never instructed as to self-defense it was
never able to consider the full meaning of this evidence.
B.
THE LAW
As early as 1943, the Utah Supreme Court held that each party
is entitled to have his theory of the case, if supported by
competent evidence, submitted to the jury by appropriate instructions.
In State v. Newton, 105 Ut. 561, 144 P.2d 290 (1943) the court
said:
,r

We have held that each party is entitled to have his
theory of the case which is supported by competent
evidence, submitted to the jury by appropriate
instructions; and that the failure to present for the
jury's consideration a party's theory by appropriate
instructions constitutes reversible error."
144 P.2d at 292.
The Court reaffirmed that principle in State v. Johnson,
112 Ut. 130, 185 P.2d 738 (1947); State v. Castillo, 23 Ut. 2d 70,
457 P.2d 618 (1969); and State v. Gillan, 23 Ut. 2d 372, 463 P.2d
811 (1970).

The Castillo case is especially important for our

inquiry here.

In that case, this Court reaffirmed the now-axiomatic

principle that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to have
the jury instructed on his theory of the case by saying:
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"Both the State and defendant agree that a defendant is
entitled to have a jury instructed on his theory of the
case, if there be any substantial evidence to justify
giving such an instruction.11
457 P. 2d at 620.
In Castillo, this Court was called upon to review a case in
which the defense had requested a self-defense jury instruction
in an assault with a deadly weapon case; which request was refused
by the trial court.

Although the Court did not precisely rule on

that issue, it held that:
11

. . . w e are unable to conclude that the result of this
case would have been different had the jury been
instructed on the question of self-defense . . ."
457 P.2d at 620.

Despite that holding, the Court enunciated clearly when a
self-defense instruction should be given by a trial court:
"If the defendant's evidence, although in material conflict
with the State1s proof, be such that the jury may entertain
a reasonable doubt as to whether or not he acted in self-defense
he is entitled to have the jury instructed fully and clearly
on the law of self-defense. Conversely, if all reasonable
men must conclude that the evidence is so slight as to be
incapable of raising a reasonable doubt in the jury's
mind as to whether a defendant accused of a crime acted in
self-defense, tendered instructions thereon are properly
refused."
457 P.2d at 620
It is helpful to see what facts the Court relied on to
affirm the judgement in that case:
"Defendant admits that he barged into his victim's
dwelling, a victim whom he had previously beaten.
He came armed with a knife in anticipation of trouble,
although his sole ground for apprehension was his
observation of a stick under a couch cushion on a prior
occasion. He claims that he has absolutely no recollection
of his victim being stabbed but merely hypothesizes that
apparently she sustained wounds to two diverse parts of
her body while he was legitimately exercising his right of
self-defense."
457 P.2d at 620.
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It seems clear that the facts in that case differ
significantly from the instant case where the appellant and the
victim shared a common outside cell area; appellant was not armed
"in anticipation of trouble"; and the alleged assault was not by
a man with a weapon upon a woman.

It seems clear from Castillo's

facts that a self-defense instruction was not proper, but those
facts are far removed from the facts in the instant case.
It is clear that appellant was entitled to have the jury
instructed on his theory of the case and the facts discussed in
Part A of this Point outlined a situation in which a trier of fact
could reasonably have believed appellant struck Hart, in selfdefense.

The trial court's refusal to instruct on self-defense

constituted prejudicial error and appellant believes he should be
entitled to a new trial.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons previously presented, appellant urges this
Court to reverse his conviction and grant him a new trial.

Resp^eptfully submitted

LARRY^R. KELLER '
Attorney/for Appellant
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